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Abstract
Fewer women than men become executive managers. They earn less over their careers, hold
more junior positions, and exit the occupation at a faster rate. We compiled a large panel data
set on executives and formed a career hierarchy to analyze mobility and compensation. We ￿nd,
controlling for executive rank and background, women earn higher compensation than men,
experience more income uncertainty, and are promoted more quickly. Amongst survivors, being
female increases the chance of becoming CEO. The unconditional gender pay gap and job-rank
di⁄erences are primarily attributable to female executives exiting the occupation at higher rates
than men.
I. Introduction
This paper studies gender di⁄erences in mobility and compensation among top executives based
on a large matched panel data set on executives and their ￿rms. First we explore the di⁄erence in
mobility rates and compensation between male and female executives by education and employment
history. Then we develop a dynamic decomposition framework to quantify the e⁄ects of gender
di⁄erences in characteristics upon entering the market for top executives (age, education, rank, and
complete labor market history), exit rates from the top-executive occupation, and job transitions
throughout their executive careers (both internal rank transitions and transitions that involve
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Female Executives?".￿rm turnover) on the gender gap in compensation, expected career length, and the probability of
becoming a CEO.
While there is a large literature on gender gaps in the labor market, few studies focus on the
gender gap for top executives in publicly traded ￿rms. Four exceptions are Bertrand and Hallock
(2001), Bell (2005), Albanesi and Olivetti (2008), and Selody (2010). While we used the same
primary data source for compensation as the above mentioned papers, our paper di⁄ers in three
major aspects. First, we match the compensation data with detailed executive-background charac-
teristics, allowing us to account for gender di⁄erences in educational attainment and actual labor
market experience.1 Second, we construct a detailed career hierarchy of rank and use it to analyze
gender di⁄erences in mobility patterns. Third, following the literature on executive compensation
(see Antle and Smith, 1985, 1986; Hall and Liebman, 1998; Margiotta and Miller, 2000; Gayle
and Miller, 2009a, among others), we used a comprehensive measure of total compensation that
includes direct compensation plus the changes in wealth from holding ￿rm options and restricted
stocks, instead of accounting only for direct compensation.
In order to study gender di⁄erences in mobility (i.e., promotions, demotions and lateral moves),
we need to construct a hierarchy of ranks. Our approach builds on the case study of internal
promotions within a single ￿rm by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994b), which follows the ￿rm￿ s
white-collar workers over a broader span of their life cycle. Our framework, however, covers job
transitions within and between ￿rms. In the spirit of Baker et al. (1994b), we adopt two axioms for
de￿ning a job hierarchy: that promotions should re￿ ect life-cycle job transitions and that employee
compensation, and payo⁄-relevant variables that change over time within a job spell, should not
determine rank. We add a third axiom that every hierarchy should satisfy, called transitivity: No
sequence of consecutive promotions should constitute a demotion.2 De￿ned this way, a hierarchy
is an example of a rational ordering. Our data on promotion and turnover are drawn from roughly
2,500 publicly listed ￿rms, 30,000 executives and 60 job descriptions over a 16-year period. From
this large longitudinal data set compiled from observations on executives and their ￿rms, we de￿ne
and construct a career hierarchy, ranking jobs in the executive market and reporting on their
transition matrices.
1Mincer and Polachek (1974), O￿ Neill and Polachek (1993), Wellington (1993), and Gayle and Golan (2011) have
shown that actual labor market experience accounts for most of the gender wage gap among ordinary workers.
2The data in Baker et al. (1994b) automatically satisfy the third axiom without further restrictions.
1Only 5% of executive management is female. This fact suggests that female executives may be
drawn from a more select population than male executives are. Consequently, their characteristics
may di⁄er from those of male executives. Assuming compensation and promotion rates do not
vary with gender, female executives being more quali￿ed than male executives could suggest that
gender discrimination exists in this market. To address these selection issues, we augmented about
half the data on executive promotion, turnover, and compensation with the subjects￿professional
and demographic background information compiled from the Marquis Who￿ s Who, which contains
details about listees￿ age, gender, education, work experience, executive experience, and ￿rms
that employ them. Our empirical analysis shows that male and female executives have di⁄erent
background characteristics and experience. We ￿nd that women are paid more and that their
pay is tied more closely to the ￿rm￿ s performance (i.e., they have higher pay-for-performance than
men), conditional on rank, background, and experience. We also ￿nd that women are promoted
faster internally, but display similar rates of external promotion and demotion. Female executives,
however, have higher exit rates than men. Both at age 39 and age 49, the probability of a female
executive becoming CEO is less than half that of male executives.
The decomposition shows that male executives￿survival rate is twice that of female executives.
We ￿nd that the di⁄erences in initial rank and in transitions to ranks have almost no e⁄ect on
the di⁄erences in career length, suggesting that these di⁄erences are not because women begin in
or transition into ￿dead-end￿positions. Instead, most of the gender di⁄erences in career length
are accounted for by the di⁄erence in exit rates. The gender di⁄erential of becoming a CEO is
explained jointly by the di⁄erences in initial rank and exit rates. In fact, conditional on survival
as an executive at any age, women have a higher probability of becoming a CEO than men. We
￿nd that the average career compensation as well as overall career compensation are lower for
women than men at all ages. As suggested by the regression analysis, the di⁄erences are not
driven by unequal pay. The exit rate as well as initial assignments are the largest factors driving
the di⁄erences in average and total career compensation. Overall, our ￿ndings suggest that the
di⁄erential occupational exit rates between the genders create a spurious gap in average lifetime
compensation as average compensation rises with rank. While explaining the source of the gender
di⁄erences in exit rates is beyond the scope of this paper, our ￿ndings can be explained by women
acquiring more nonmarket human capital throughout their lives. Alternative existing theories of
2gender discrimination can explain the higher exit rates and can be consistent with some of the
evidence but have di¢ culty reconciling other patterns found in the data.
The results on the gender di⁄erence within executive management are mixed. Bell (2005), Al-
banesi and Olivetti (2008), and Selody (2010) ￿nd that women are paid less than men at equivalent
ranks, contradicting earlier work on this subject by Bertrand and Hallock (2001). With respect
to compensation level, our results con￿rm those of Bertrand and Hallock (2001), while our ￿nding
on volatility contradicts ￿ndings in Albanesi and Olivetti (2008) and Selody (2010). We ￿nd that
women have the same pay sensitivity to bad outcomes, but they have higher sensitivity to good ￿rm
performance than men have. This contradiction is mainly due to the highly nonlinear nature of
the dependence of pay on ￿rm performance and the fact that, as documented in Hall and Liebman
(1998) and Gayle and Miller (2009a), most of the variability of compensation comes from changes
in wealth from holding ￿rm options and restricted stocks.
Albrecht, Bj￿rklund, and Vroman (2003) recently concluded there is a glass ceiling in Sweden
because women are underrepresented in the upper quantiles of the wage distribution. Similarly,
Blau and Kahn (2004) concluded from their study of wage data for the United States that the gender
gap stopped shrinking 15 years ago and has not closed. Black et al. (2008) report that, although
highly educated women earn approximately 30% less than men, more than half, but typically less
than all of the di⁄erence, is accounted for by background variables such as age, education, and
work experience. Their results are corroborated in a study of successive cohorts of MBA graduates
from the University of Chicago by Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010), who report that gender
di⁄erences in the wages of young professionals can be largely attributed to di⁄erences in college
education, career interruptions, and weekly hours worked.
The gender di⁄erences in the executive labor market cannot be de￿nitively understood with
wage data alone. Men and women are also distinguished by their promotion rates (or more generally
job transitions), as well as occupational exit rates. Ginther and Hayes (1999, 2003); McDowell,
Singell, and Ziliak (1999); and Ginther and Kahn (2004) compared the trajectories of male and
female academic faculty in the social sciences and humanities, ￿nding that women tend be paid
less at any given rank and are also less likely to be promoted. Pekkarinen and Vartiainen￿ s (2004)
empirical study of metal workers in Finland found that women are internally promoted more slowly
than men. By way of contrast, we ￿nd that within executive management women are more likely
3than men to be promoted conditional on rank, background, and experience. However, our results
on the di⁄erential exit rate between the genders are consistent with previous results found for
academics.
Section II describes our data and variable construction. Section III presents our empirical
analysis. Section IV presents our decomposition, and Section V discusses our ￿ndings and concludes.
II. Data and Hierarchy Constructions
The main sample for this study consists of data on the 2,818 ￿rms from the December 2006
version of the Standard and Poor￿ s (S&P) ExecuComp database supplemented by the S&P COM-
PUSTAT North America database and monthly stock price data from the Center for Securities
Research database. We also gathered background history for a subsample of 16,300 executives,
recovered by matching the 30,614 executives from our COMPUSTAT database for the period 1991
to 2006 using their full name, year of birth, and gender with the records in the Marquis Who￿ s
Who, which contains biographies of about 350,000 executives.
A. Main Sample
Most of the characteristics of the executives and ￿rms in the main sample require no (further)
explanation, but the construction of several variables merits remarks. The sample of ￿rms was
initially partitioned into three industrial sectors by GICS code. Sector 1, called primary, includes
￿rms in energy (GICS:1010), materials (1510), industrials (2010, 2020, 2030), and utilities (5510).
Sector 2, consumer goods, consists of ￿rms from consumer discretionary (2510, 2520, 2530, 2540,
2550), and consumer staples (3010, 3020, 3030). Firms in health care (3510, 3520), ￿nancial services
(4010, 4020, 4030, 4040), information technology, and telecommunication services (410, 4520, 4030,
4040, 5010) comprise Sector 3, which we call services. In the main sample, 35% of the ￿rms belong
to the primary sector, 27% to consumer goods, and the remaining 38% to the services. Firm size
was categorized by total employees and total assets. The sample mean value of total assets is $13.3
billion (2006 US) with standard deviation $62 billion, while the sample mean number of employees
is 18,930 with standard deviation 52,520.
Top executives are rarely paid like most other professionals, at a rate more or less equalized
across a large market for similarly skilled workers after adjusting for cost of living and amenity
4indices. Executive compensation is tied instead to various indicators of managerial e⁄ort, such
as the ￿rm￿ s performance. As such, we followed the literature on executive compensation and
constructed the widely used measure of ￿rm performance, abnormal returns on stock. Denote the
total wage bill of executives in all positions by Wt+1 and the dividend paid to shareholders by
Dt+1. Let et denote the equity value of the ￿rm at time t and ￿t+1 denote the return on the market
portfolio. We then de￿ne the gross abnormal return to the ￿rm before factoring the aggregate
compensation costs as
(1) ￿t+1 =






Abnormal return is then calculated using the formula in Equation (1), where the value of equity
at the beginning and end of the year and dividends paid during the year are taken from the S&P
COMPUSTAT North America database and the market return is calculated using monthly stock-
price data from the Center for Securities Research database.
B. Matched Sample
The matched sample consists of a subsample of 16,300 executives for whom we gathered back-
ground history. The matched data gives us unprecedented access to detailed ￿rm characteristics,
including accounting and ￿nancial data, along with managers￿characteristics, namely the main
components of their compensation, including pension, salary, bonus, option, and stock grants plus
holdings, and their sociodemographic characteristics, including age, gender, education, and a com-
prehensive description of their career path sequence described by their annual transitions through
the 35 possible positions. In the matched sample, 36% of the ￿rms belong to the primary sector (as
opposed to 35% for the main sample), 27% to consumer goods (the same as in the main sample) and
the remaining 37% to the services sector (as opposed to the 38% in the main sample). Therefore,
as far as the sectorial composition of the sample is concerned, the two sample are almost identical.
The matched sample mean value of total assets is $13.8 billion (2006 US) with standard deviation
$63.2 billion, while the matched sample mean number of employees is 19,600 with standard devia-
tion 54,000. The ￿rms in the matched sample are slightly larger than the ￿rms in the main sample
on both measures of ￿rm size.
5C. Hierarchy Construction
The question of gender di⁄erences in mobility presupposes a hierarchy of ranks. The approach
we take to constructing such a hierarchy builds on the personnel economics literature (see Baker,
Gibbs, and Holmstrom, 1994a; Gibbons and Waldman, 1999; Barmby et al., 2001). Typically the
purpose of the hierarchy is to study the relationship between job mobility and compensation; in
order to do that, the hierarchy is constructed independent of compensation. Here, we follow the
approach in Baker et al. (1994a) of building a hierarchy based on executives￿transitions across
di⁄erent jobs; we formalize the approach and generalize it to multiple ￿rms. Because the hierarchy
is constructed using patterns of transitions across di⁄erent job titles, it captures career paths and
life-cycle transitions. The data we use to construct a career hierarchy were compiled from annual
records on 30,614 individual executives, taken from the S&P ExecuComp database, itemizing their
compensation and describing their title. Each executive worked for one of the 2,818 ￿rms comprising
the (composite) S&P 500, Midcap, and Smallcap indices for at least one year spanning the period
1991 to 2006, which covers about 85% of the U.S. equities market. In the years for which we have
observations, the executive was one of up to the top-paid eight in the ￿rm, whose compensation
was reported to the SEC. We coded the position of each executive in any given year with one of 35
abbreviated titles listed in Table 1, which formed the basis of our hierarchy.3
We de￿ne a career hierarchy as a rational (complete and transitive) ordering over a set of
job titles based on transitions. Speci￿cally, let J denote a ￿nite collection of job titles, denoted
j 2 f1;:::;Jg. We denote the probability of switching from the jth to the kth job by pjk. Supposing
pkj ￿ pjk; we write j ￿ k: We impose the property of transitivity. Thus if pkj ￿ pjk and pj0k ￿ pkj0
then j ￿ j0. If j ￿ k and k ￿ j, then j ￿ k. If j ￿ k but j ￿ k, then j ￿ k, in which case we say
that the jth job ranks higher than the kth. Thus, indi⁄erence occurs if pjk = pkj; or if, for example
pkj > pjk (implying j ￿ k) but there exists a j0 such that pj0k ￿ pkj0 and pjj0 ￿ pj0j (implying
k ￿ j). An ordered rank is ascribed to each of the distinct indi⁄erence sets, with Rank 1 topping
the hierarchy.
3We encountered a further 60 titles used fewer than three times each. These jobs were easy to rank within
the hierarchy we constructed, but our analysis and conclusions are not a⁄ected by omitting the small number of
observations involved either. We also experimented with ￿ner partitions of job titles, re￿ning job title by ￿rm size
(doubling the number of titles with an indicator designating big or small) and by sector (which triples the number of
jobs). The main practical di¢ culty of increasing the number of job titles is the resulting small number of women in
many job title cells. On the overall sample, we found that the transition patterns were not sensitive to the de￿nitions
of the partition we tested.
6Since there is only a ￿nite number of jobs, the algorithm described above ensures the ranking is
complete. This ranking has a second desirable property. Suppose we strengthened the requirement
to say that pkj￿pjk ￿ p for some p > 0 as a necessary condition for j ￿ k, then it is straightforward
to show that we would end up with a coarser partition de￿ning the hierarchy. Similarly relaxing
our de￿nition to say that pkj ￿ pjk ￿ p for some p < 0 as a su¢ cient condition for j ￿ k would
yield a coarser partition. In this respect, the de￿nition we adopt maximizes the number of ranks.
Upon applying the algorithm to our data, summarized by the 35 job titles and the one-period
estimated probability of job transitions, 14 ranks emerged, which are displayed in Figure 1. The
numbered circles in the ￿gure are keys to the job titles in Table 1, and each job title is aligned to
its rank indicated on the left. To convey a sense of the life-cycle ￿ ow through jobs, we have drawn
arrows pointing from title j to title k if at least 2% of the executives in job j move to job k the
next period. Because there are so few female executives, we further consolidated the 14 ranks into
seven as presented in Table 1. Most of the hierarchy conforms more or less to the commonly held
notion of the structure of the ￿rm with the exception that Rank 1 is not the rank to which CEO
belongs. Rank 2 includes the CEO position, whereas Rank 1 is reserved for the chairman of the
board of directors, if that position is separated from the job of CEO. In hindsight, this is quite
reasonable based on the reporting structure of a ￿rm. As will become clear later when we compare
compensation across this hierarchy, Rank 2 (to which CEO belongs) can be considered the top of
the hierarchy and Rank 1 is a type of retirement or monitoring position.
D. Measuring Total Compensation for Executives
We followed Antle and Smith (1985, 1986), Hall and Liebman (1998), Margiotta and Miller
(2000), and Gayle and Miller (2009a, 2009b) by using total compensation to measure executive
compensation. Total compensation is the sum of salary and bonus, the value of restricted stocks
and options granted, the value of retirement and long-term compensation schemes, plus changes
in wealth from holding ￿rm options, and changes in wealth from holding ￿rm stock relative to a
well-diversi￿ed market portfolio instead. Changes in wealth from holding ￿rm stock and options
re￿ ect the costs managers incur from not being able to fully diversify their wealth portfolios be-
cause of restrictions on stock and option sales. When forming their portfolio of real and ￿nancial
assets, managers recognize that part of the return from their ￿rm-denominated securities should
7be attributed to aggregate factors, so they reduce their holdings of other stocks to neutralize those
factors. Hence, the change in wealth from holding their ￿rms￿stock is the value of the stock at
the beginning of the period multiplied by the abnormal return, de￿ned as the residual component
of returns that cannot be priced by aggregate factors the manager does not control. In the full
sample, the average total compensation is $1.85 Million (measured in 2006 U.S dollars) and it is
four times the average executive salary, con￿rming the well-documented fact that more than 75% of
an executive￿ s total compensation consists of ￿rm-denominated securities and bonuses. This ratio
is even higher in the matched sample. This is because overall compensation and the fraction of
nonsalary pay increases with ￿rm size and the average ￿rm is larger in our matched sample than
in our main sample. The characteristics of the full and matched samples are presented in Table 1
in the online Appendix.
E. Measuring Exit from the Occupation of Top Executives
General management is a very broad and loosely de￿ned occupational category. The identi-
fying feature of the managers in our study is that they are so highly paid and exercise so much
discretion within their ￿rms that their employers make available for public scrutiny their compen-
sation records, typically determined at the highest levels by an executive compensation committee.
So for the purposes of this study, we de￿ne executive management as an occupation of general
managers in publicly traded ￿rms whose compensation and ￿nancial assets in their employer ￿rm
are reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Although ￿rms are only required to
report on their top ￿ve executives, the SEC accepts and publishes data from ￿rms that provide
the records on more employees, and most ￿rms do. For all such ￿rms, the SEC requirement is not
a binding constraint, but a device to help the ￿rms establish and maintain credibility with their
shareholders and bondholders.
Like any tightly de￿ned occupation, executive management is porous. People become executive
managers through promotion within the ￿rm or from another publicly traded company, transfer
from a privately held company or a nonpro￿t organization, or coming out of retirement. They exit
from executive management by retiring, by accepting less prestigious and less well-paid positions
within management (having been overtaken by other executives within the company and sidelined
without a title change or summarily demoted), by transferring to an organization not listed on an
8exchange (such as starting a sole proprietorship), or entering another occupation (that makes more
use of previously acquired professional quali￿cations, for example). Nonetheless, it is instructive
to compare the fortunes of top executives by gender since executive management epitomizes the
pinnacle of employment within the ￿rm. It is heavily dominated by men, but it is not their exclusive
domain.
We construct a sample measure of this population￿ s exit variable that captures the above
types of exit from executive management. As such, we de￿ne our outside option called exit as an
absorbing state: If an executive leaves all our data sets and does not return for four years, the
executive is classi￿ed as exited. Note that the following are not classi￿ed as exit: If an executive
disappears from the sample because the ￿rm becomes a nonpublicly traded company; if the ￿rm
drops from the COMPUSTAT data sets; if the company is merged with another company and does
not report any more; if the ￿rm goes completely out of business; if the executive exits the sample
in the last four years of the sample. Less than 1% of those leaving for more than three years appear
again in our data sets, showing that any potential right censuring is minimal. By this measure, on
average 20% of our executives leave each year in the main sample, and 26% in the matched sample
(see Table 1 in the online Appendix).
F. Measuring Human Capital
Two types of human capital are measured and used in the analysis: formal education and job
experience. There are ￿ve nondisjoint categories of formal education: No college degree, Bachelor
degree, Masters of Business Administration (MBA), Masters of Science/Arts (MS/MA), Doctor
of Philosophy (Ph.D.), and Professional Certi￿cation. While all the other categories are self-
explanatory, it is worth noting that Professional Certi￿cation includes accounting, engineering,
legal, ￿nancial, and other professional certi￿cations, such as chartered public accountant or certi￿ed
￿nancial analyst.
Four measures of experience were included to capture the potential di⁄erent dimensions of
on-the-job training. Managerial experience is the number of years elapsed since the manager was
￿rst recorded as holding one of the 41 titles listed in Table 1. Tenure is years spent working at the
executive￿ s current ￿rm. We also track the number of di⁄erent ￿rms the executives have worked
for over their careers, as well as the number of moves before becoming an executive. Promotion is
9an indicator variable for whether the manager was promoted in the previous year.
III. Empirical Results
This section documents gender di⁄erences in compensation and mobility patterns. Previous
literature on the gender gap has conclusively shown that a major part of the gender pay gap
can be attributed to gender di⁄erences in such background characteristics as education and work
experience. However, existing papers on the executive pay gap do not have measures of education
or work experience. In this section, we investigate whether a gender gap in executives￿background
characteristics exists.
We then explore the sources of the gender di⁄erences in compensation. Bertrand and Hallock
(2001) ￿nd that after controlling for ￿rm type and executive position, there is no economic or
signi￿cant pay gap between female and male executives. They postulate that discrimination can still
manifest itself via unequal access to promotion between men and women. We replicate Bertrand and
Hallock￿ s (2001) results and proceed to explore possible explanations for these gaps by analyzing the
e⁄ect of background characteristics and the gender di⁄erences in promotions, demotions, turnover,
and exit.
A. Executive Background
There are several signi￿cant di⁄erences in the background characteristics of male and female
executives in our sample. Female executives are less likely to hold a college degree than their male
counterparts; 23% of female executives do not have a college degree as compared to 21% of male
executives. This di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. Men and women executives are
equally likely to obtain an MBA, which means that a higher fraction of women with a ￿rst degree
go on to get an MBA. Male executives are more likely to have a Masters of Science or Arts, while
female executives are more likely to have a Ph.D. Women are more likely to have a professional
certi￿cation than men.
On average, women have two years less tenure in the ￿rm and two and a half years less executive
experience than men. Women are, on average, three years younger than men, they change ￿rms
less frequently than men before becoming executives, but there is no di⁄erence in the total number
of ￿rm changes. This means that women have more ￿rms changes after becoming an executive.
10As noted in previous studies, there is some degree of gender segmentation by sector, with women
concentrated more in the consumer goods sector while men are more concentrated in the primary
sector. The genders are equally represented in the service sector. There is no signi￿cant gender
di⁄erence in the size of ￿rms. The summary measures of the background variables by ￿rm types
and by gender are displayed in Table 1 in the online Appendix.
Table 2 presents the characteristics of executives by rank. The average age declines from 60
to 52 between Ranks 1 and 3, but is more or less constant as rank falls o⁄ further. Similarly,
average tenure is roughly constant in the lower and middle ranks at 14, but rises to 15 and 17 for
Ranks 2 and 1, respectively. The average gap between Ranks 1 and 3 in executive experience is
six years. Relative to the lower ranks, Rank-1 and -2 executives are eight years older, with only
six years more executive experience and just two years more tenure. Executives with MBA degrees
are more concentrated in the top four ranks, those with other Masters or Ph.D. degrees are more
concentrated in the lower ranks. Average total compensation, its salary components, and their
respective standard deviations rise by more than a factor of two from Rank 7 to Rank 2, in which
they are at their maximum and even across genders, and decline slightly in Rank 1.
Table 2 also presents the sample means of executives￿background characteristics, compensa-
tion, and ￿rm characteristics by rank and gender. We focus on the gender di⁄erences in educational
attainment, age, and job experience. The table shows that the gender di⁄erences in background
characteristics are not constant across ranks. Women in Rank 1 are more educated than their
male counterparts. Women and men CEOs (Rank 2) are equally educated, and the same is true of
executives in Rank 3. At the lower ranks (i.e., Rank 3 through Rank 7), the results are less clear,
depending on the type of educational attainment, male or female executives may be considered
more educated. In Rank 4 women are less likely to have a college degree, MS/MA, Ph.D., or a
professional certi￿cation, whereas they are signi￿cantly more likely to have an MBA than men.
In Ranks 5 through 7, women are less likely to have a college degree than men. However, women
are similar to men on other dimensions of educational attainment. In Rank 6, women and men
are similar on all dimensions of educational attainment except that women are more likely to have
a Ph.D. and to be professionally certi￿ed. This pattern changes again in Rank 7, with men and
women equally likely to graduate from college, men more likely to have an MBA and women more
likely to have a Ph.D.
11The age di⁄erence between men and women declines with rank and is eventually eliminated
by Rank 7. The exception to this general pattern is Rank 3, where there is no signi￿cant gender
age di⁄erence. A similar pattern to age obtains for managerial experience, except that the gender
di⁄erence is only equalized at Rank 7 and the gender di⁄erence is much larger than the gender
di⁄erence in age in Rank 1. Men have almost 10 years more managerial experience than women in
Rank 1, this di⁄erence falls to two years by Rank 2. A similar pattern holds for tenure. Women
worked in fewer ￿rms than men in every rank with the exception of Rank 2, Rank 6, and Rank 7. It
is worth pointing out that women and men CEOs (i.e., Rank 2) are the same along this dimension
which is not true for the other experience variables considered; in fact, women CEOs worked in
more ￿rms before becoming an executive than men.
In summary, female and male executives look very di⁄erent in terms of educational attainment,
age, and work experience. See Mincer and Polachek (1974), O￿ Neill and Polachek (1993), Wellington
(1993), and Gayle and Golan (2011) for similar ￿ndings for nonexecutives. These di⁄erences vary
by rank and are smallest in Rank 2 and in low-level ranks.
B. Compensation
In the full sample, men earn on average $80,000 more than women in salary and $540,000 more
than women in total compensation. In the matched sample, men earn on average $84,000 more
in salary and $440,000 more in total compensation (see Table 1 in the online Appendix). Table 2
describes salary and total compensation by rank and gender, showing that, controlling for rank,
there is no gender pay di⁄erence in Rank 1, Rank 2 (i.e., CEOs), Rank 3 and Rank 5. In Rank
4, Rank 6, and Rank 7, men are paid more than women in salary, but not in total compensation.
These results are consistent with Bertrand and Hallock (2001), who ￿nd no gender pay gap after
controlling for the executives￿rank.
Since men and women di⁄er with respect to their background characteristics, we further explore
the conditional gender pay gap. Table 3A presents the median regression estimates of gender￿ s e⁄ect
on total compensation, showing that including measures of educational attainment, age, and job
experience in the compensation equation dramatically increases the compensation premium paid
to female executives and their pay-for-performance sensitivity relative to male executives. It also
suggests that the compensation premium paid to female executives is related to female executives￿
12higher pay-for-performance sensitivity, relative to their male counterparts.
The results in Column (1) show that, without including any ￿rm, sector, and executive-
characteristic controls, the median female executive is paid about $111,000 less than her male
counterparts. Column (2) adds measures of rank, abnormal return, age, ￿rm size, and sector,
showing that there is a statistically insigni￿cant female premium of $41,000. The female pay is
less sensitive to the ￿rm￿ s performance: female executives earn about $253,000 less than male ex-
ecutives for a 1% increase in their ￿rms￿abnormal return. Including these variables increases the
regression￿ s R2 to 24% from 1%. Column (3) shows that adding measures of executive educational
attainment and job experience increases the female premium to $92,000, while the gender gap in
pay-for-performance sensitivity increases to $286,000 for a 1% increase in the ￿rm￿ s abnormal re-
turn. The R2 of the regression increases slightly to 25%. Column (4) adds gender interactions
with the measures of job experience and educational attainment: the female premium increases to
$266,000 and the gender gap in pay-for-performance sensitivity increases to $327,000 per 1% in-
crease in the ￿rm￿ s abnormal return. Column (4) further shows that the returns to job experience
do not di⁄er by gender, but the returns to education do. Female executives receive $256,000 more
per year in compensation than their male counterparts if they do not have a college degree and
$292,000 more than men if they have an MBA degree.
To further explore the gender di⁄erences in pay for performance, Column (5) adds a dummy
variable which takes the value of 1 if the abnormal return of the ￿rm is negative, an interaction of the
negative return dummy with abnormal returns, the negative abnormal return dummy interaction
with gender, and an interaction of the negative return dummy with both abnormal return and
gender. It shows that both the female pay premium and the gender gap in pay for performance
disappear. The female pay premium now loads on the female negative return dummy and the
gender gap in pay-for-performance sensitivity is now reversed; female executives are insured against
negative abnormal return by being paid $309,000 more than male executives when the abnormal
return is negative. They also received $489,000 more (less) than their male counterparts for a 1%
increase (decrease) in their ￿rms￿abnormal return. Column (5) also shows that there is no di⁄erence
between male and female executives￿pay for performance when abnormal return is negative. These
results contradict Albanesi and Olivetti￿ s (2008) ￿ndings that female executives are punished more
for negative returns but are rewarded less for positive returns. To determine if the di⁄erences stem
13from inclusion of background characteristics or because we use a more comprehensive measure of
total compensation than used in Albanesi and Olivetti (2008), we repeat the exercise in Column (5)
excluding the measures of executive background. The results are presented in Column (6), showing
that there is a negative and insigni￿cant female premium, but female executives are rewarded more
for positive abnormal returns and punished less for negative abnormal returns than their male
counterparts.4
Table 3B presents the median regression estimates of the e⁄ect of gender on salary. It shows
that there is a signi￿cant gender gap in salary of $10,000 even when one includes measures of ex-
ecutive background. However, this gender salary gap disappears when we allow for gender-speci￿c
returns to education and job experience. Column (1) does not include any control for rank, ￿rm
characteristics, sector, or executive background characteristics, indicating that the median woman
is paid about $77,000 less than her male counterpart in salary. Column (2) adds measures of rank,
abnormal return, age, ￿rm size, and sector; the gender e⁄ect decreases to a (statistically insigni￿-
cant) $10,000 salary gap and female executives have the same salary-for-performance sensitivity as
their male counterparts. Column (3) adds measures of educational attainment and job experience,
indicating no change in the results from Column (2). Column (4) adds gender interactions with
the measures of job experience and educational attainment, showing that the gender salary gap
disappears, but that there is still a gender gap in salary-for-performance sensitivity. It also shows
that the returns to job experience do not di⁄er by gender, whereas the returns to educational
attainment do. Column (5) adds a dummy variable for negative abnormal return, an interaction
of the negative return dummy with abnormal returns, the negative abnormal return dummy inter-
acted with gender, and an interaction of the negative return dummy with both abnormal return
and gender. There are, however, no signi￿cant changes in the results from Column (4).
4These results were also con￿rmed using direct compensation which is a less comprehensive measure of compen-
sation (not reported here). Direct compensation is the total compensation excluding changes in wealth from holding
￿rm options and stocks relative to holding a well-diversi￿ed market portfolio instead. The direct compensation regres-
sions show that women are paid a positive but statistically insigni￿cant compensation premium in all speci￿cations
except speci￿cation (1); the results on pay-for-performance sensitivity of female relative to male executives are similar
to those found in Table 3A. These results further support our conclusion that the compensation premium paid to
female executives is related to gender di⁄erence in pay-for-performance sensitivity, since the only di⁄erence between
direct compensation and total compensation is the variation related the ￿ uctuation in value of the ￿rm denominated
securities.
14C. Mobility
The results in Tables 3A and 3B do not rule out the possibility of gender discrimination;
fewer women than men make it to the top of the hierarchy and this could be a channel of gender
discrimination. Tables 4 and 5 present the internal and external transition-probability matrices by
gender. The two most conspicuous features of these tables are the small fraction of women versus
men in Rank 1 and the high incidence of women CEOs (Rank 2) who change ￿rms and remain
CEOs compared to men. Only 57% of male CEOs who change ￿rms remain CEOs in their new
￿rm while 93% of female CEOs remain CEOs in their new ￿rm. We performed a chi-squared test
of the gender di⁄erences in transitions and found that both internal and external transitions di⁄er
signi￿cantly by gender.5 We then excluded Rank 1 from consideration and found that the internal
transitions, but not the external transitions, di⁄er signi￿cantly by gender.
The above results do not take into consideration executive and ￿rm characteristics, which we
explore in the following regressions. We ￿rst estimated the e⁄ect of gender on the one-period tran-
sitions (see Table 2 in the online Appendix). We found that there are signi￿cant gender di⁄erences
in both the external and internal transition, conditional on executive and ￿rm characteristics, but
it is di¢ cult to ascertain, however, whether female executives are disadvantaged relative male ex-
ecutives from these estimates. For example, female executives in Rank 2 (i.e., CEOs) are less likely
than males to move to Ranks 3, 6, and 7 internally, relative to remaining in Rank 2 but they are
more likely than men to move internally to Rank 4. Conditional on changing ￿rm, women are more
likely than men to move to Rank 2, but this is not true for any other given position. In light of
these results we estimated binary logits on promotion, demotion, and turnover to get a better sense
of gender di⁄erences in directional changes in mobility between men and women.
Table 6 presents the binary logit coe¢ cient estimates of the e⁄ect of gender on one-period
promotions, demotions, and turnover. It implies that women are 27% more likely to be promoted
than men internally and are promoted at the same rates externally, while there is no gender di⁄er-
ence in the rate of demotion and turnover. Column (1) includes neither educational attainment nor
job experience variables and indicates no signi￿cant gender di⁄erences in the rates of internal and
external transitions. Column (2) adds gender￿ age interactions, making the internal female e⁄ect
5We repeated the test for the normalized transition Matrix because there are signi￿cantly more male than female
executives. The normalized transition test excludes all same-rank transitions from consideration. This in e⁄ect
normalized for the number of men and women in each rank and hence on the executives who change ranks. This did
not a⁄ect our results.
15larger and signi￿cant. The external female e⁄ect remains insigni￿cant. There is now a negative
female e⁄ect on age, showing that younger women are more likely to be promoted than younger
men. Column (3) shows that this general pattern is repeated even when educational attainment,
job experience, and gender interaction variables are included. Columns (4), (5), and (6) show that
there are no gender di⁄erences in demotions; Columns (7), (8), and (9) show that there are no
gender di⁄erences in the turnover.
We ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences between male and female mobility rates which, on the surface,
seem to favor women. Women are promoted more than men internally and at the same rate
externally. In addition, women are promoted at a younger age.
D. Occupation Exit Rates
An important question in the gender-gap literature is whether women have weaker attachment
to their jobs and the labor market than men do. For example, Gayle and Golan (2011) shows that
weaker labor market attachment among women accounts for the gender earnings gap at early ages.
Here, we analyze this question in the market for executives, who are normally beyond child-bearing
age. Thus, we do not attribute exit to fertility and childcare considerations.
In both the matched and full samples women exit the executive occupation at a higher rate
than men; in the matched sample, there is a 5% di⁄erences in the exit probability and 3% in the
full sample (see Table 1 in the Appendix). Table 2 shows that most of this di⁄erence in exit rate
can be attributed to exit at the lower ranks. There is no di⁄erence in the occupation exit rates
in Rank 1, Rank 2, and Rank 3, but women exit the occupation at a substantially higher rate in
all other ranks. Table 7 presents the binary logit coe¢ cient estimates of the e⁄ect of gender on
the occupation exit rate. It shows that, controlling for executives and ￿rms characteristics, women
at all ranks exit the executive occupation at higher rates than men. Column (1) includes neither
educational attainment nor job experience variables and indicates that women at all ranks are 76%
more likely to exit the executive occupation than similar men. Column (2) adds education and job
experience variables and gender interactions showing that the female e⁄ect increases to 158%.
Table 7 also shows that all executives are less likely to exit the occupation when their ￿rms do
well; the coe¢ cient estimates on abnormal return and lagged abnormal return are both negative
and signi￿cant. To examine if women executives are judged more harshly than their male counter-
16parts, perhaps because they attract more scrutiny in an occupation dominated by males, we add
interaction terms of female and abnormal return. The results reported in Column (3) show that
the female coe¢ cient is small and statistically insigni￿cant, indicating that there is no signi￿cant
gender di⁄erence in the likelihood of exit when the ￿rm performs worse than the market. Column
(4) adds negative abnormal return and gender interactions without changing the previous results.
Column (5) adds CEO and female interaction terms with negative abnormal return; while CEOs
are more likely than other executives to exit when the ￿rm performs badly, we do not ￿nd evidence
for gender di⁄erences.
E. Summary and Robustness
The above empirical analysis shows that female and male executives di⁄er with regards to
educational attainment and job experience. Female executives are on average two years younger
and have less job experience by most measures. It also shows that conditional on ￿rm and executive
characteristics, female executives are paid more in total compensation and have higher pay for
performance than their male counterparts. The higher pay is related to the higher volatility in
pay induced by the higher pay for performance. In terms of mobility, women are promoted at a
higher rate than men but also exit at a much higher rate. These ￿ndings, however, are based the
matched sample which is not completely representative of the full sample. While the magnitudes
are di⁄erent, however, the qualitative features of the full sample are preserved by the matched
sample (see Table 1 in the online Appendix). The main di⁄erences between the full and matched
samples are the exit rates, compensation, and ￿rm size. The exit rates are higher in the matched
sample, but the di⁄erences between male and female executives are qualitatively similar. The
compensation is also higher in the matched sample and the executives are drawn from larger ￿rms.
These two features are intertwined in that compensation is positively related to ￿rm size. Panel B
of Table 2 shows the characteristics of the full sample by rank. The magnitudes are again di⁄erent
from the matched sample, but the qualitative patterns are similar. Conditional on rank, there
are no di⁄erences in total compensation by gender between the samples. Thus our analysis of the
results from the matched sample might overstate the magnitude of the gender di⁄erences, but we
are con￿dent that the qualitative patterns are re￿ ected in the full sample.
17IV. Decomposition
Our empirical results suggest that three main factors might explain the ￿ndings that female
executives earn less than their male counterparts, even though they are paid signi￿cantly more at
most ranks for the same experience and their overall rate of promotion is greater than men￿ s. First,
women have di⁄erent characteristics than men when they become top executives. Notably, they
di⁄er in their mix of experience, which might a⁄ect their career trajectories through the executive
ranks. Second, in a profession that rewards experience, given the same background and experience,
women are more likely to exit the occupation. Third, within the ￿rm, women are promoted at
younger ages, and more quickly, than men. We analyze the e⁄ects of these three factors, by
constructing a dynamic system from the estimated equations obtained in the previous sections.
This system provides the basis for conducting a statistical decomposition that quanti￿es the e⁄ect
of each of these factors on the gender di⁄erences in the length of careers, how high executives of
di⁄erent types climb the career ladder, how executive compensation evolves with rank and over
time, and life time compensation.
A. Framework
Let h denote a set of state variables characterizing ￿rm-speci￿c and general human capital
that help determine compensation and job transitions between and within ￿rms. To quantify
comparisons between female and male executive careers, it is convenient to let an f superscript
stand for women and an m superscript stand for men when referring to an executive of gender g 2
ff;mg. Let p
(g)
t (r0;h0 jr;h) denote the joint probability that an executive aged t 2 ft0;t0 + 1;:::g
holding rank r 2 f1;2;:::;Rg and experience h 2 H moves to rank r0 2 f1;2;:::;Rg and acquires
experience h0 2 H next period, conditional on remaining in executive management for another
period. Let p
(g)
tr0 (h) denote the corresponding probability of exiting the occupation at age t from
rank r and q(g) (t0;r;h) denote the joint distribution of r and h at some starting age t0. Then
q(g) (t;r;h)￿ the joint probability that a person who was an executive at age t0 is still in the
executive population at age t, and at that age holds rank r and has experience h￿ is recursively
de￿ned by















18Hence, the survivor function, denoted by Q
(g)






















tr (h) denote compensation as a function of human capital, rank, and age. The


















We use this framework to conduct dynamic decompositions, illustrating the quantitative im-
pact of di⁄erent features of the background variables; wage regressions; transition probabilities for
promotions, demotions, and ￿rm mobility; and occupation exit rate on the gender gap in executive
careers.
B. The E⁄ect of Occupation Exit
In principle, the di⁄erential occupation exit rates, rank transition probabilities, or initial condi-
tions can explain the men￿ s longer duration in executive management. The di⁄erential occupational
exit rates between the genders can create a spurious gap in average lifetime compensation if average
compensation rises with ranks that are de￿ned using a life-cycle criterion. The empirical results
show that women are 158% more likely to exit the occupation than men. To illustrate the quan-
titative importance of this point, we computed the survivor rates for the population, and showed
how they are a⁄ected by di⁄erent features of gender-speci￿c behavior.
In our empirical model, there are seven ranks (R = 7). Executive experience (EEXPt), tenure
with the ￿rm (TEN t), the number of ￿rm changes (NFC t), and the number of ￿rm changes before
19becoming an executive (NFCBEt) are a⁄ected by past outcomes and also help determine future
outcomes. We de￿ne experience by ht ￿ (EEXPt;TEN t;NFC t;NFCBEt). By de￿nition, ht follows
the law of motion:
ht+1 = kt￿1 (ht) + (1 ￿ kt)￿0(ht);
where kt 2 f0;1g is an indicator variable for staying in the ￿rm versus moving to another ￿rm and
￿1(ht) ￿ (EEXPt + 1;0;NFC t + 1;NFCBEt)
￿0(ht) ￿ (EEXPt + 1;TEN t + 1;NFC t;NFCBEt):
Estimates of experience and rank, ptr0 (h), the exit rate as a function of the same variables, and
pt (s;h0 j r;h), the rank-and-experience transition probability, were found by respectively integrating
the exit hazard and transition probability with respect to the remaining variables: educational
background, ￿rm size, sector characteristics, and excess returns.
Since age is a signi￿cant determinant of compensation and rank, we computed all our measures
for executives who were in executive management at the median age, 49, and also at the 20th
percentile, 39. Table 3 in the online Appendix displays the probability distribution over the ranks
and backgrounds of executives by gender for those two age groups. The top two ranks include 13%
of the 39-year-old men compared to 1% of the women at that age. At age 49, however, 22% of the
men are at the top two positions, whereas 12% of women are in those ranks. Yet, 39-year-old women
have as much managerial experience as their male counterparts, while 49-year-old women have a
little less. Controlling for age, women have slightly less tenure and exhibit more job movement.
Figure 2 depicts the survival function by gender, Q
(g)
t ; found by substituting q(g) (t;r;h) for
q (t;r;h) in Equation (3), for t0 = 39 and t0 = 49 (see also the ￿rst panel in Table 4 in the online
Appendix). At both ages, just over one third of female executives leave after one year, and only
about 10% survive six years or more. The survivor rate for men is much higher. Over 80% last more
than a year, and more than 20% longer than six years, the older group of men experiencing less exit







the gender speci￿c analogue to Equation (4), total expected future career length for an executive
of gender g 2 fm;fg and age t0. The top two entries in the two panels of Table 8 show that
regardless of the two methods of selection, being an executive manager at age 49 and being an
20executive manager at age 39, the expected remaining duration in executive management is just
over three years for women and about ￿ve for men, almost two years longer for men versus women.
Suppose women changed in just one respect, by following the exit behavior of men. That is,
instead of the discrete hazard p
(f)
tr0 (h), we now suppose p
(m)
tr0 (h) applied. Denoting the defective
probability distribution for describing the survivors in this counterfactual by q(f;exit) (t;r;h), we
computed estimates of q(f;exit) (t;r;h) from the recursion


















tr0 (h) with p
(m)
tr0 (h) and q(f) (t;r;h) with q(f;exit) (t;r;h) in Equation (2). Summing
q(f;exit) (t;r;h) over h and r, we obtained the survivor function for women when they leave from
the sample population at the same rate as men given the same experience and rank. From Figure
2, we see that this counterfactual exercise practically closes the gender gap between the survivor
functions. Re￿ ecting the importance of this factor, Table 8 shows that the expected career duration
increases from one and a half years to about four and a half years, not quite equalizing the expected
career lengths for the genders.
Another counterfactual, which speaks to the question of why women tend to have shorter
careers, is to replace p
(f)
t (s;h0 j r;h) with p
(m)
t (s;h0 j r;h) in Equation (2) to obtain
















This would generate the survivor function for women if they experienced the same rank transitions
as men throughout their careers in executive management, and tell us whether women executives
tend to gravitate to ￿dead-end￿positions that are associated with higher rates of exit. We can
also calculate the di⁄erential e⁄ect of initial conditions on women by replacing q(f) (t0;r;h) with
q(m) (t0;r;h) and q(f) (t;r;h) with q(f;initial) (t;r;h) in Equation (2), de￿ned in an analogous way.
Since there are fewer female executives than male executives, there may be greater selectivity into
the sample by those women who are less likely to leave the sample population, suggesting that the
aggregate rate of female exit in some sense understates the underlying process.
As an empirical matter, gender di⁄erences in the rank transition probabilities and initial con-
ditions a⁄ect the di⁄erences in the survivor functions only minimally. Replacing p
(f)
t (s;h0 j r;h)
21with p
(m)
t (s;h0 j r;h) and q(f) (t;r;h) with q(f;rank) (t;r;h) in Equation (2) yields the survivor func-
tion for women if they experienced the same rank transitions as men throughout their careers
in executive management. Similarly, we calculated the di⁄erential e⁄ect of initial conditions on
women by replacing q(f) (t0;r;h) with q(m) (t0;r;h) and q(f) (t;r;h) with q(f;initial) (t;r;h) in Equa-
tion (2). The initial conditions are the composite of the initial rank assignment and the initial level
of human capital. Let q(f;rinitial) (t;r;h) denotes the counterfactual survival probabilities if women
changed in just one respect, by following the initial rank assignment of men. The di⁄erential e⁄ect
of initial rank assignment on women is calculated by replacing q(f) (t0;r;h) with q(m) ￿
t0;r;hf￿
and q(f) (t;r;h) with q(f;rinitial) (t;r;h) in Equation (2), where q(m) ￿
t0;r;hf￿
is the joint probability
that a female executive at age t0 holds the rank of her male counterpart but the experience of a
female executive. In all cases, the shift in the survivor function is barely visible at this level of
resolution. From Table 7, swapping the initial conditions, or changing the transition probability,
increases the expected career length for female executives in the panel at 39 and 49 by less than a
month. Summarizing, the direct e⁄ect of exit rate explains most of the di⁄erence in career length
of female and male executive managers.
C. Is There a Glass Ceiling?
With estimates of q(g) (t;r;h), we can now answer whether women executives are less likely
than men to achieve the pinnacle of executive management and if so, why. The probability that an




The top two panels of Figure 3 show that executives in the sample at 49 are more than twice
as likely to be a CEO than an executive in the sample 10 years younger, re￿ ecting our life-cycle
approach to the de￿nition of a career hierarchy. Female executives in the population at either age
are less than half as likely to be CEOs as men.
What explains these gender di⁄erences? Are women promoted within the ￿rm more slowly and
less likely to accept attractive o⁄ers from other ￿rms? We replace set q(f) (t;2;h) by q(f;rank) (t;2;h)
in Equation (7) and checked how much the probability of being a CEO increased when women
transitioned through the ranks following the same transition matrix as men. Figure 3 shows that
22the e⁄ect of this counterfactual is small (see also the last four panels of Table 4 in the online
Appendix). In other words, the gender di⁄erential in probability of being a CEO is primarily due
to di⁄erences in the other two factors, exit rate and initial conditions.
Replacing q(f) (t;2;h) by q(f;initial) (t;2;h) in Equation (7) yields the probability of a woman
executive at age t0, being a CEO at age t if she had been assigned the initial endowment of men. By
construction, the probability at t0 is equal, but it quickly falls o⁄, partly because of the di⁄erential
exit rates. Breaking things down further, we investigated to what extent their initial assignment,
conditional on their past experience, is a determining factor, versus the di⁄erent background they
have at the time. We found that only the initial rank counts, not initial di⁄erences in execu-
tive experience, industry background, or education. Replacing q(f) (t;2;h) by q(f;rinitial) (t;2;h) in
Equation (7) produces a line in Figure 3 that practically overlays the q(f;initial) (t;2) line.
The higher rate of female exit shrinks the pool of female candidates eligible to be CEO,
thus contributing to the gender di⁄erences. If female exit patterns mimicked those of their male
colleagues, would the sequence of probabilities close the gap? Upon replacing q(f) (t;2;h) by
q(f;exit) (t;2;h) in Equation (7), Figure 3 shows that the sequence of probabilities would increase,
but not close the gap. Thus, both initial conditions and exit rate are important explanatory factors
for why women are less likely to make CEO than men.
We can eliminate the e⁄ects of exit rate, and mitigate through the passage of time, the e⁄ects
of the initial conditions, by analyzing the pool of survivors. The probability of being a CEO with
gender g at age t conditional on belonging to the population at age t0 and remaining in it until at









The panels in the second row of Figure 3 (and the third panel in Table 4 in the online Appendix) have
two notable features that characterize both age groups. Conditional on survival, the probability of
being a CEO increases for more than a decade, rising to and then remaining above one half for a
further 10 years (and longer for the younger group). More remarkably, amongst those who survive
longer than 15 years, a woman invariably has a higher probability of being a CEO than a man!
This ￿nding contradicts the common belief that women face glass ceilings.
There are, of course, alternative de￿nitions of top management, and we investigated whether
23our conclusions are sensitive to them. In our career hierarchy, chairmen who are not also o¢ cers
directly under the CEO (such as the CFO and the COO) are classi￿ed in Rank 1. Rather than
focus on Expression (7) only, we also experimented with a more inclusive de￿nition of top executive
position by combining the two top ranks, and recomputing the comparable panels of the second
row. The probability of being in the two top ranks with gender g at age t conditional on belonging
to the population at age t0 and surviving until age t at least is










There is little to distinguish between the second-row panels and fourth-row panels, which depict
our estimates of q(g)(t;2)+q(g)(t;1). Using either de￿nition of top management, our results provide
scant support for the view that female executives in publicly listed companies face glass ceilings.
An alternative approach to measuring female representation at the highest levels of manage-
ment is to compute, by gender, the fraction of executives who pass through the rank of CEO
before exiting. Denote by q(CEO;g)(t;2) the number of executives who were in the sample at age
t0 2 f39;49g and had at least one year of CEO experience by age t, as a fraction of the sum of this
number plus executives who are still waiting for the job of CEO, having neither quit the sample
by age t nor made CEO. Within our framework, this counterfactual is equivalent to treating the
CEO rank as an absorbing state, thus eliminating CEO exit, leaving the other exit probabilities
unchanged, and assuming that an executive attaining the rank of CEO never changes rank again.6
Thus,

























From the third panel of Figure 3 (or the fourth panel of Table 4 in the online Appendix), we see
that the crossover occurs earlier than in the second panel, thus validating our ￿nding: Amongst
survivors, women have a higher probability of reaching the position of CEO than men. The fact
6Mathematically, we set p
(CEO;g)
t20 (h) = 0, leave p
(CEO;g)
tr0 (h) = p
(g)
tr0 (h) for all r 6= 2, and set p
(CEO;g)
t (2;h
0 j 2;h) =
1, which implies p
(CEO;g)
t (s;h
0 j2;h) = 0 for all s 6= 2.
24that their crossover age is about two years younger indicates that their tenure as a CEO is also a
little lower, partly attributable to their higher rate of exit.
D. Lifetime Compensation
Although female executives are paid more than male executives for a speci￿c experience vector
at any given rank, and have a higher probability of attaining the position of CEO than male
executives conditional on remaining in top management, they exit more than men from these very
senior positions. This reduces the net present value of their lifetime earnings in this occupation.
In this section, we decompose the gender compensation gap into the amount due to di⁄erential
occupation exit rates, rank transition probability, and initial conditions. In this part of the study,
we focus on two measures of lifetime earnings. The ￿rst measure is the sum of discounted expected












where ￿ is the subjective discount factor. The second measure we use is average annual career
wages, which corresponds to the steady-state cross-sectional average earnings. Average annual




t0 , where W
(f)
t0 is just Equation (5) de￿ned
t0-year-old female executives, averaged over their experience and ranks.
Integrating the estimates obtained from the compensation regressions reported in Table 3A





expected discounted sum of compensation V
(f)
t0 from age t0 onwards, as well as the analogous
quantities for men, setting the discount factor to ￿ = 0:9. Then we computed counterfactuals for
these numbers by endowing female executives with some of the factors that determine the executive
careers of men.
The top entries in the middle column of the two panels of Table 8 imply that the estimated
gender gap in (undiscounted) annual compensation for executives at age 39 and 49 averaged over
the remainder of their management career is about $100,000. Given the longer career horizon of
men, at a 10% discount factor this translates to a present value of about $2 million, which can be
deduced from the third column. The gender gap in these career measures of executive compensation
is not attributable to unequal pay for equal work. Our compensation regressions, reported in Table
253A, showed that at any given rank women are paid more for the same experience credentials.
Substituting q(m) (t;r;h) for q(f) (t;r;h) in Equations (5) and (9) for t0 2 f39;49g, we ￿nd that the
men would bene￿t about $100,000 per year on average from receiving the compensation package
of women, all else the same, which translates to about $400,000 in present value terms over their
careers as executives, numbers that follow from di⁄erencing the top from the bottom numbers in
the middle and right columns of Table 8.
We investigated the e⁄ect of assigning the initial male distribution of ranks to female ex-







t0 . Table 8 shows that the initial assignment has greater impact (rising
by $134,600 for the older group, $76,400 for the younger) than the transition probability computed
in a similar fashion (where the numbers are $65,500 and $55,900, respectively). Most of the ef-







t0 . Indeed, giving 49-year-old female executives the
distribution of male initial experience actually reduces their average annual earnings throughout
their career. Note that because these changes hardly a⁄ect the survivor function, the e⁄ect on
discounted career earnings is attenuated.
Giving female executives the same exit rates as male executives signi￿cantly lengthens their
expected durations and, for that reason alone, generates higher expected discounted sums. To deter-
mine the e⁄ect of imposing male exit rates on women, we substituted q(f;exit) (t;r;h) for q(f) (t;r;h)




t0 . The gender gap for discounted earnings
over the remaining career declines substantially from $2.3 million to $699,000 for 49-year-old ex-
ecutives and even more for 39-year-old executives, from $1.85 million to $249,000. However, the
evidence from annual average career compensation is inconclusive. If 39-year-old female executives
substituted male exit behavior for their own, then their annual compensation would rise by $69,100
per year, but for 49-year-old executives, compensation would actually fall by $44,800.
In identifying the most important factors driving the average annual gender compensation
gap, we should distinguish between the two age groups. Focusing ￿rst on the top panel, we see
that if 49-year-old female executives had been assigned the initial rank distribution for men, their
average career wage, $2,296,800 would have surpassed the corresponding ￿gure for men ($2,195,200)
by about $100,000. The remaining factors, gender di⁄erences in exit rates, job transitions, and
26the initial distribution of experience, collectively accounted for less than $2,000 per year of the
di⁄erential between what women and men would earn if they received female compensation awards.
Thus, for the older group, the initial distribution of ranks fully accounts for the pay gap between
men and women. This result contrasts with our ￿ndings for the younger group of executives, where
switching the exit rate plays a much greater role in closing the gap between female average earnings
and the hypothetical earnings men would make from receiving female wages. The e⁄ect on total
earnings from spending an average of an extra 18 months in executive management is therefore
more pronounced at 39 than at 49.
Table 8 (and also Table 4 in the online Appendix) shows that the gender di⁄erences in com-
pensation, expected career length, and the probability of becoming a CEO are almost entirely
accounted for by di⁄erences in exit rates, transitions rates, and initial conditions. It presents a
summary measure of all the other components of the decomposition; it combines the per period
compensation, expected career length, and rank distribution into one measure, expected lifetime
compensation. It shows that the gender di⁄erences are more pronounced at age 49 than at age 39.
At 49 the gaps are accounted for by gender di⁄erences in the distributions of rank and experience
at that age and the exit and job-transition rates thereafter. At 39 the gaps are accounted for
by the gender di⁄erences in exit and job-transition rates. However the gender di⁄erences in the
distributions of experience and rank at age 39 are not important.
The di⁄erences between the distributions of rank and experience at ages 39 and 49 are due to
a combination of exit and job-transition rates during that time. This means that gender di⁄erences
in exit and job-transition rates are more important in explaining the gender di⁄erences in career
outcomes than gender di⁄erences in the distributions of rank and experience at age 39. Extrapo-
lating, perhaps the di⁄erences in exit and job-transition rates before age 39 account for the gender
di⁄erences observed at age 39.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
Our empirical analysis shows that female executives have di⁄erent backgrounds and experi-
ence from male executives and that women are paid more and have higher pay-for-performance
sensitivity than men conditional on rank, background, and experience. We also ￿nd that women
are promoted more quickly internally; however women and men display similar rates of external
27promotion to men and have comparable demotion rates. Because female executives have a higher
rate of promotion at the upper levels of the hierarchy, they have signi￿cantly less job experience
than male executives. Female executives, however, have a higher exit rate than men, and the prob-
ability of a female executive becoming CEO is less than half that of male executives at every age.
Our decomposition shows that the male executives￿survival rate is twice that of female executives.
The gender di⁄erences in career length are fully accounted for by the di⁄erence in exit rates, and,
conditional on survival as an executive at any age, women have a higher probability of becoming a
CEO. The average career compensation of female executives is lower than that of male executives,
but it is higher than male executives￿if female executives are assigned the male initial experience,
the male initial rank assignment, or the male career experience distribution.
Suppose executives have concave utility over consumption and there are no gender di⁄erences
in preferences and unobserved ability. Suppose that lower level ranks provide more opportunities
for investment in human capital and that a longer tenure and experience in these ranks increase
the productivity of executives more than tenure and experience in higher ranks. If women have an
exogenously higher non-market outside option than men, then a model of moral hazard, investment
in human capital, and career concerns can account for most of the above ￿ndings (see Gayle, Golan,
and Miller, 2011).
An exogenously higher non-market outside option implies that women at all ranks and expe-
rience level would exit at higher rate than men. A higher female exit rate has two separate e⁄ects;
the ￿rst is that female executives would gravitate to higher ranks and spend less time investing
in human capital. This would explain the higher female promotion rate, the lower human capital
of female in higher ranks, and the unconditional gender pay gap. The second e⁄ect is that female
executives would have less incentive to exert e⁄ort than male executives because, on average, their
careers are shorter. Since their career concerns motive is weaker, females require more incentive pay
to align their incentives with those of their employer ￿rms than their male counterparts. Therefore
their compensation is tied more closely to the ￿rm￿ s performance with a higher risk premium.
Suppose that expected compensation re￿ ects an executive￿ s marginal product, that marginal
product is equalized across genders, and females are paid the same expected compensation as
their male counterparts. Equalizing expected compensation with a higher risk premium implies
a lower certainty equivalent compensation. Being paid a lower certainty equivalent compensation
28makes a job even less attractive to females, and thus ampli￿es the higher female quit rate. These
explanations appear consistent with our ￿ndings.
There is still a question why women ￿nd the nonmarket outside option more attractive than
men. One explanation is that women acquire more nonmarket human capital than men throughout
their lives, and hence ￿nd retirement a relatively attractive option. Women in the top executive
market are mostly beyond childbearing age, but there is evidence that such women are more likely
to leave for personal and other household reasons than their male counterparts. For example,
Sicherman (1996) ￿nds that in a case study of a large insurance company, female executives were
more likely than their male counterparts to exit the ￿rm because of better working conditions
elsewhere, to be near home, change of residence, household duties, personal heath, illness in the
family, and positions abolished. Most of those reasons, except position abolished, are voluntary
departures related to home or family. Other unobserved factors leading managers to exit could
include more unpleasantness, indignities, and tougher unrewarding assignments at work, examples
of factors that reduce the attraction of work without necessarily a⁄ecting productivity or human-
capital acquisition. Perhaps women are subject to this form of gender discrimination.
Another possible explanation for the higher female exit rates is di⁄erential treatment of men
and women with the same expected ability in this market. Perhaps there is more uncertainty
about women￿ s skills, when they enter the sample (see Lundberg and Startz, 1983); this hypothesis
is supported by the fact that when women enter, they are younger, have less experience, and fewer
quali￿cations than men. The hypothesis that there is more uncertainty about women￿ s ability is
consistent with the fact that women are more likely to exit and that those who remain are more
likely to get promoted and earn higher wages as more information about their ability is revealed
over time. Suppose that bad performance provides a signal on an executive￿ s ability. If ￿rms have
more uncertainty about women￿ s ability than men, then the relationship between ￿rm performance
and the rate of exit should di⁄er by gender. However, we do not ￿nd any di⁄erences on that score.
A more complex model of promotions and uncertainty about abilities is developed in Scotchmer
(2008); it assumes no gender di⁄erences in abilities, but that men take more risk and therefore
provide less accurate information on their abilities than women. In her model men are more likely
than women to survive and get promoted more at early ages, and male survivors have lower average
ability than females. At older ages these roles are reversed; females are promoted more, and their
29average ability is lower, than male survivors. In our sample, we do ￿nd that males are more likely
to survive at lower ranks than female; however, female are promoted more quickly than males at
all ranks and ages.
Another type of discrimination is suggested by Milgrom and Oster (1987). In their model
abilities of executives are known to employers, but initially males are more visible to outside em-
ployers than females allowing employers to extract more rents from female executives. Promotions
enhance visibility of workers to outside employers; this increases competition for female executives,
which in turn increases their compensation and reduces the employers￿rents. Their model implies
that female executives would face a higher threshold for promotion than their male counterparts.
Further, it implies that the gender compensation gap in high ranks should be smaller than the gap
in lower ranks. We ￿nd that male and female executives are paid the same conditional on rank
alone. Conditional on background characteristics and job-experience female executives are paid
more than their male counterparts at all ranks. Moreover, we do not ￿nd di⁄erences in external
promotion rates between males and females, which might be expected if women were less visible
than men.
Our analysis, cannot rule out discrimination based on unobserved factors. However, whatever
the mix of the explanations above, we do not ￿nd any clear evidence that aggregate di⁄erences
observed in the executive market between genders are driven by compensation packages and pro-
motion opportunities available to men and women. It is possible that discrimination explains, at
least partially, the small fraction of women, compared to men who join the ranks of executive man-
agement in publicly listed ￿rms. We are unable to address this issue because our data set comprises
only those who reach these positions, but our analysis identi￿es one reason for the relative scarcity
of female executives. Women executive managers are more likely to exit than men, on average
spending less time in those positions than male executives do.
In principle, a large longitudinal data set might be assembled to track men and women from
an early age in order to distinguish by gender the contribution of background variables of those
who attain the position of executive manager from those who do not. The results of our study
highlight two challenges that such an approach must overcome to yield convincing results. We have
established that executive managers are not drawn from an easily identi￿ed population. Because
they are drawn from very diverse backgrounds, because executive managers comprise a minute por-
30tion of the general population, and because women are less than one tenth as likely to be executive
managers as men, a very large sample is required to obtain meaningful results that separate by gen-
der those who become executive managers from those who do not. A second challenge proponents
of a longitudinal approach would face, stems from the fact that many executive, enter the market
after a long period of acquiring education and other work experience, requiring a longitudinal study
to track respondents for more than 20 consecutive years, an expensive long-term research project
susceptible to choice-based attrition bias. In the meantime, we hope our results will encourage fu-
ture research on gender di⁄erences in executive management to turn away from compensation and
promotion, towards the nonpecuniary characteristics of executive management jobs and options
outside the marketplace.
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33Table 1: Titles and Ranks
Observations
Codea Title(s) Male Female
Rank 1b 5;901 100
1a Chairman of the Board & Vice Chairman of the Board
2a Chairman of the Board & Other Executiveb of a Subsidiary/Region
2a Chairman & Vice Chairman of a Subsidiary/Region
2a Chairman of the Board & Chief Executive O¢ cer of a Subsidiary/Region
2a Chairman & Vice Chairman of a Subsidiary/Region
Rank 2 24;570 371
3a Chairman of the Board & President & Chief Executive O¢ cer of the Company
3b Chief Executive O¢ cer of the Company
Rank 3 6;570 149
4a President & Chief Operating O¢ cer of the Company
5a Chairman of the Board & Chief Financial O¢ cer of the Company
6a Chairman of the Board & Executive Vice President of the Company
6b Chairman of the Board & Chief Operating O¢ cer of the Company
Rank 4 26;711 1;518
7a Executive Vice President of the Company
8a Executive Vice President & Chief Operating O¢ cer of the Company
8b Executive Vice President & Chief Financial O¢ cer of the Company
8c Chief Operating O¢ cer of the Company
Rank 5 22;295 1;384
9a Senior Vice President of the Company
9b President of a Subsidiary/Region
9c Executive Vice President & Other Executivea of the Company
9d Executive Vice President of the Company & President of a Subsidiary/Region
9e Executive Vice President of the Company & Chief Operating O¢ cer of a Subsidiary/Region
9e Executive Vice President of the Company & Chief Executive O¢ cer of a Subsidiary/Region
9f President & Chief Operating O¢ cer of a Subsidiary/Region
9f President & Chief Operating O¢ cer of a Subsidiary/Region
10a President & Executive Vice President of the Company
Rank 6 20;025 1;510
11a Vice President of the Company
11b Senior Vice President & Other Executivea of the Company
11c Vice President & Other Executivea of the Company
11d Chief Financial O¢ cer & Other Executivea of the Company
11e Senior Vice President & Chief Financial O¢ cer of the Company
11f Senior Vice President of the Company & President of a Subsidiary/Region
12a Senior Vice President & Chief Operating O¢ cer of the Company
12c President & Other Executivea of the Company
12d President & Chief Financial O¢ cer of the Company
Rank 7 8;331 517
12b Senior Vice President of the Company & Chief Executive O¢ cer of a Subsidiary/Region
13a Other Executivea of the Company & Chief Executive O¢ cer of a Subsidiary/Region
13b Chief Operating O¢ cer of a Subsidiary/Region
13c Vice President & Chief Financial O¢ cer of the Company
13d Vice President of the Company & President of a Subsidiary/Region
13e Vice President of the Company & Chief Executive O¢ cer of a Subsidiary/Region
13e Vice President of the Company & Chief Operating O¢ cer of a Subsidiary/Region
14a Chief Financial O¢ cer
aCodes are the 35 abbreviated titles and the numbers attached to the codes represent the 14 levels of
a hierarchy into which these titles were partitioned. b Ranks are a cruder partition of the 14 levels to
make the empirical analysis manageable. cOther Executive includes titles that did not occur often enough
to warrant their own category and hence were grouped together. These include, but are not limited

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 3A: Median Regression Estimates of the E⁄ect of Gender on Total Compensation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female ￿111:08 41:09 91:73 266:52 ￿1:45 ￿95:89
(60:77) (42:56) (45:91) (133:50) (147:66) (67:80)
Negative Ab. Return dummy￿Female 308:96 131:29
(130:89) (103:00)
Ab. Return￿Female ￿253:24 ￿286:29 ￿327:35 489:53 312:85
(69:20) (75:04) (82:65) (114:88) (82:70)
Ab. Return￿Negative Ab. Return dummy￿Female ￿475:17 ￿547:87
(279:99) (214:59)








Professional Certi￿cation￿Female ￿192:72 ￿130:18
(124:86) (118:20)








Experience variables no no yes yes yes no
Rank dummies no yes yes yes yes yes
Ab. Return no yes yes yes yes yes
Ab. Return￿ Rank interactions no yes yes yes yes yes
Negative Ab. Return dummy no no no no yes yes
Ab. Return￿Negative Ab. Return dummy no no no no yes yes
Education variables no no yes yes yes no
Exp.￿ Gender interactions no no no yes yes no
Educ.￿ Gender interactions no no no yes yes no
Return￿ Exp. interactions no no yes yes yes no
Return￿ Educ. interactions no no yes yes yes no
Firm-Level variables no yes yes yes yes yes
Return￿ Firm interactions no yes yes yes yes yes
N 58,110 48,065 35,893 35,893 35,893 48,065
R2 0.01 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.24
Sources. Data are from S&P ExecuComp, COMPUSTAT, and Marquis Who￿ s Who databases.
Note. Dependent Variable: Yearly Total Compensation, 1992￿ 2006. Standard errors in parentheses.
Compensation is measured in thousands of 2006 US$. We apply a 1% trim for outliers. The ￿Negative
Ab. Return dummy￿equals 1 if the abnormal return is less than zero and 0 otherwise. Abnormal (Ab.)
return is measured as a fraction between ￿1 and 1. Columns (2)￿ (5) include age, age squared, and
age interacted with abnormal return. Education variables are No College, MBA, MS/MA, Ph.D., and
Professional Certi￿cation. Firm-level variables are sector, assets, and number of employees. Experience
variables are turnover, managerial experience (Exec. Exp.), tenure, ￿rm changes before becoming an
executive (NFCBE), and total number of ￿rm changes (NFC). Column (2) has fewer observations because
it excludes ￿rms whose stock prices are not available for two consecutive periods. Columns (3)￿ (5) have
even fewer observations because they also exclude executives who are not observed for two consecutive
periods.
37Table 3B: Median Regression Estimates of the E⁄ect of Gender on Salary.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female ￿77:69 ￿10:80 ￿10:69 20:29 12:15
(6:23) (4:35) (4:68) (12:56) (14:44)
Negative Ab. Return dummy￿Female ￿3:54
(12:75)
Ab. Return￿Negative Ab. Return dummy￿Female ￿13:44
(26:60)
Ab. Return￿Female 6:24 9:13 6:70 ￿2:23
(6:48) (6:99) (6:89) (8:71)








Professional Certi￿cation￿Female ￿22:864 ￿24:14
(11:45) (11:73)








Experience variables no no yes yes yes
Rank dummies no yes yes yes yes
Ab. Return no yes yes yes yes
Ab. Return￿ Rank interactions no yes yes yes yes
Negative Ab. Return dummy no no no no yes
Ab. Return￿Negative Ab. Return dummy no no no no yes
Education variables no no yes yes yes
Exp.￿ Gender interactions no no no yes yes
Educ.￿ Gender interactions no no no yes yes
Return￿ Exp. interactions no no yes yes yes
Return￿ Educ. interactions no no yes yes yes
Firm-Level variables no yes yes yes yes
Return￿ Firm interactions no yes yes yes yes
N 59,256 49,112 36,625 36,625 36,625
R2 0.003 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.39
Sources. Data are from S&P ExecuComp, COMPUSTAT, and Marquis Who￿ s Who databases.
Note. Dependent Variable: Yearly Salary, 1992￿ 2006. Standard errors in parentheses. Salary
is measured in thousands of 2006 US$. We apply a 1% trim for outliers. The ￿Negative Ab.
Return dummy￿ equals 1 if abnormal return is less than zero and 0 otherwise. Abnormal (Ab.)
return is measured as a fraction between ￿1 and 1. Columns (2)￿ (5) include age, age squared, and
age interacted with abnormal return. Education variables are No College, MBA, MS/MA, Ph.D.,
and Professional Certi￿cation. Firm-level variables are sector, assets, and number of employees.
Experience variables are turnover, managerial experience (Exec. Exp.), tenure, ￿rm changes before
becoming an executive (NFCBE), and total number of ￿rm changes (NFC). Column (2) has fewer
observations because it excludes ￿rms whose stock prices are not available for two consecutive
periods. Columns (3)￿ (5) have even fewer observations because they also exclude executives who
are not observed for two consecutive periods.
38Table 4: Transition Probability Matrices for Internal Moves
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5 Rank 6 Rank 7 N
Panel A: Male
Rank 1 88.70 4.77 3.24 1.46 1.10 0.34 0.39 3,833 100.00
Rank 2 3.41 96.09 0.24 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.04 19,598 100.00
Rank 3 2.88 13.40 78.87 2.47 1.36 0.56 0.46 6,043 100.00
Rank 4 1.01 2.18 3.26 86.74 4.06 1.65 1.09 18,635 100.00
Rank 5 0.99 0.88 2.36 7.20 85.11 2.28 1.18 15,396 100.00
Rank 6 0.16 0.44 0.91 6.28 6.29 83.96 1.97 14,342 100.00
Rank 7 0.24 0.57 1.48 6.14 3.62 6.90 81.06 5,476 100.00
N 4,621 20,461 6,119 18,743 15,095 13,127 5,157 83,323
Panel B: Female
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5 Rank 6 Rank 7 N
Rank 1 81.82 6.06 6.06 1.52 0.00 0.00 4.55 66 100.00
Rank 2 0.75 98.51 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.37 268 100.00
Rank 3 2.60 9.74 79.22 3.90 1.95 2.60 0.00 154 100.00
Rank 4 0.72 0.82 2.46 87.06 5.75 1.95 1.23 974 100.00
Rank 5 0.35 0.69 1.27 8.99 85.02 2.07 1.61 868 100.00
Rank 6 0.00 0.21 0.31 4.15 6.01 87.15 2.18 965 100.00
Rank 7 0.00 0.65 0.00 6.17 2.92 8.12 82.14 308 100.00
N 70 301 164 992 865 907 304 3,603
Note. Percent from base rank.
Table 5: Incidence of Turnover between Firms
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5 Rank 6 Rank 7 N
Panel A: Male
Rank 1 48.56 34.16 8.23 7.00 2.06 0.00 0.00 243 100.00
Rank 2 17.84 57.12 10.63 6.31 6.67 1.08 0.36 555 100.00
Rank 3 8.23 40.33 22.22 14.81 10.70 1.23 2.47 243 100.00
Rank 4 2.46 20.33 6.39 38.36 13.93 11.80 6.72 610 100.00
Rank 5 2.10 28.74 9.11 18.69 31.07 7.01 3.27 428 100.00
Rank 6 0.28 9.44 5.00 28.89 12.78 33.89 9.72 360 100.00
Rank 7 0.64 11.46 5.73 28.66 10.83 21.66 21.02 157 100.00
N 263 797 238 551 349 267 131 2,596
Panel B: Female
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5 Rank 6 Rank 7 N
Rank 1 0.00 50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 100.00
Rank 2 0.00 92.86 0.00 0.00 7.14 0.00 0.00 14 100.00
Rank 3 0.00 25.00 0.00 75.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4 100.00
Rank 4 5.71 5.71 2.86 45.71 17.14 11.43 11.43 35 100.00
Rank 5 7.14 10.71 17.86 25.00 21.43 10.71 7.14 28 100.00
Rank 6 0.00 0.00 5.56 38.89 11.11 33.33 11.11 18 100.00
Rank 7 0.00 0.00 16.67 33.33 0.00 33.33 16.67 6 100.00
N 4 20 8 36 15 15 9 107
Note. Percent from base rank.
39Table 6: Binary Logit Coe¢ cient Estimates of the E⁄ect of Gender on Promotion, Demotion, and
Turnover
Promotiona Demotionb Turnoverc
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant 2:603 2:474 2:725 ￿2:343 ￿2:418 ￿2:253 ￿5:928 ￿5:827 ￿6:653
(0:232) (0:238) (0:288) (0:643) (0:661) (0:843) (0:861) (0:866) (1:163)
Female 0:139 3:287 3:131 0:332 1:858 2:031 ￿12:405 ￿29:657 ￿21:912
(0:204) (1:178) (1:432) (0:426) (3:023) (3:355) (40:810) (42:723) (86:321)
Rank 1 2:176 2:179 2:254 1:037 1:031 0:872
(0:133) (0:134) (0:162) (0:172) (0:172) (0:203)
Rank 2 ￿1:122 ￿1:124 ￿1:130 ￿0:592 ￿0:592 ￿0:527 ￿0:018 ￿0:019 ￿0:105
(0:043) (0:043) (0:050) (0:151) (0:151) (0:182) (0:156) (0:156) (0:182)
Rank 3 ￿0:122 ￿0:124 ￿0:159 1:051 1:050 1:131 0:273 0:274 0:270
(0:051) (0:051) (0:061) (0:142) (0:142) (0:171) (0:174) (0:174) (0:202)
Rank 4 ￿0:217 ￿0:218 ￿0:230 1:535 1:534 1:620 0:216 0:217 0:125
(0:042) (0:042) (0:049) (0:117) (0:117) (0:140) (0:158) (0:158) (0:185)
Rank 5 0:087 0:087 0:089 0:865 0:864 0:945 ￿0:013 ￿0:012 ￿0:098
(0:042) (0:042) (0:049) (0:132) (0:132) (0:157) (0:166) (0:166) (0:195)
Rank 6 0:033 0:033 ￿0:005 ￿0:095 ￿0:095 ￿0:113
(0:044) (0:044) (0:051) (0:170) (0:170) (0:197)
Rank 1￿Female 0:490 0:550 0:832 11:700 11:523
(0:679) (0:687) (0:845) (40:821) (42:712)
Rank 2￿Female 0:005 0:086 0:139 ￿0:707 ￿0:654 ￿0:536 13:058 12:855 14:151
(0:283) (0:287) (0:326) (1:105) (1:109) (1:135) (40:801) (42:720) (86:300)
Rank 3￿Female ￿0:242 ￿0:183 0:080 0:297 0:319 0:664
(0:313) (0:315) (0:402) (0:636) (0:639) (0:723)
Rank 4￿Female 0:098 0:131 0:082 0:177 0:210 ￿0:021 12:710 12:583 14:112
(0:233) (0:236) (0:269) (0:475) (0:478) (0:502) (40:821) (42:7) (86:331)
Rank 5￿Female ￿0:088 ￿0:052 0:054 ￿0:326 ￿0:312 ￿0:301 12:956 12:843 13:941
(0:235) (0:237) (0:271) (0:557) (0:557) (0:597) (40:800) (42:700) (86:300)
Rank 6￿Female ￿0:267 ￿0:231 ￿0:259 11:806 11:756 13:387
(0:237) (0:239) (0:272) (40:801) (42:7) (86:308)
External 2:064 2:063 1:986 2:138 2:138 2:091
(0:069) (0:069) (0:081) (0:107) (0:107) (0:130)
External￿Female ￿0:331 ￿0:283 ￿0:744 ￿0:149 ￿0:115 ￿1:021
(0:370) (0:372) (0:420) (0:562) (0:564) (0:851)
Age ￿0:098 ￿0:093 ￿0:101 ￿0:054 ￿0:051 ￿0:058 0:098 0:093 0:132
(0:008) (0:008) (0:010) (0:023) (0:023) (0:029) (0:031) (0:031) (0:042)
Age Sq. 0:001 0:001 0:001 0:000 0:000 0:000 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Age￿Female ￿0:113 ￿0:123 ￿0:063 ￿0:072 0:722 0:335
(0:041) (0:050) (0:105) (0:118) (0:505) (0:447)
Age Sq.￿Female 0:001 0:001 0:001 0:001 ￿0:007 ￿0:004
(0:000) (0:000) (0:001) (0:001) (0:005) (0:004)
Experience variables no no yes no no yes no no yes
Experience￿ Gender interaction no no yes no no yes no no yes
Education variables no no yes no no yes no no yes
Education￿ Gender interactions no no yes no no yes no no yes
N 40,840 40,840 30,343 33,564 33,564 24,883 34,705 34,705 25,732
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. aThe promotion variable is a binary variable equal one if an executive
moved to a higher rank next period and zero otherwise. Promotion is not de￿ned for Rank-1 executives.
bThe demotion variable is a binary variable equal one if an executive moved to a lower rank next period
and zero otherwise. Demotion is not de￿ned for Rank 7 executives. We used the matched sample with
all observations for executives coded for two consecutive time periods. The sample for the estimation of
promotion excludes all current Rank 1 executives while the sample for demotion excludes all current Rank 7
executives. cTurnover is a binary variable equal to one if an executive changed ￿rms from one period to the
next. The sample is the same as the promotion, but includes observations on all ranks including Rank 1.
All regressions include sectorial dummies, assets, employees, compensation last period, education variables,
and job-experience variables.
40Table 7: Binary Logit Coe¢ cient Estimates of the E⁄ect of Gender on Occupation Exit Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant ￿2:238 ￿2:313 ￿2:313 ￿2:631 ￿2:612
(0:348) (0:416) (0:416) (0:420) (0:420)
Female 0:650 1:119 1:127 1:124 1:076
(0:341) (0:499) (0:500) (0:519) (0:521)
Ab. Return ￿0:203 ￿0:149 ￿0:148 0:126 0:121
(0:039) (0:042) (0:043) (0:045) (0:045)
Ab. Return￿Female ￿0:015 0:064 0:049
(0:236) (0:308) (0:305)
Negative Return ￿0:991 ￿0:908
(0:107) (0:114)
Negative Return￿Female ￿0:090 ￿0:350
(0:675) (0:694)
CEO￿ s Negative Return ￿0:441
(0:205)
CEO￿ s Negative Return￿Female 1:920
(1:455)
Ab. Return Lagged ￿0:157 ￿0:166 ￿0:168 ￿0:171 ￿0:171
(0:033) (0:038) (0:038) (0:037) (0:037)
Ab. Return Lagged￿Female 0:082 0:093 0:088
(0:214) (0:210) (0:211)
Rank 1 0:244 0:288 0:288 0:301 0:299
(0:091) (0:103) (0:103) (0:103) (0:103)
Rank 2 ￿0:998 ￿0:967 ￿0:967 ￿0:981 ￿1:087
(0:084) (0:095) (0:095) (0:096) (0:108)
Rank 3 ￿0:446 ￿0:393 ￿0:393 ￿0:395 ￿0:395
(0:101) (0:116) (0:116) (0:116) (0:116)
Rank 4 ￿0:116 ￿0:091 ￿0:091 ￿0:087 ￿0:088
(0:081) (0:092) (0:092) (0:092) (0:092)
Rank 5 0:056 0:058 0:058 0:068 0:067
(0:081) (0:092) (0:092) (0:092) (0:092)
Rank 6 ￿0:065 ￿0:060 ￿0:060 ￿0:055 ￿0:055
(0:083) (0:093) (0:093) (0:093) (0:093)
Rank 1￿Female ￿0:645 0:434 0:441 0:571 0:593
(0:803) (1:032) (1:033) (1:041) (1:043)
Rank 2￿Female ￿0:220 ￿0:276 ￿0:267 ￿0:355 0:257
(0:543) (0:625) (0:629) (0:638) (0:768)
Rank 3￿Female ￿0:828 ￿0:647 ￿0:646 ￿0:616 ￿0:632
(0:545) (0:788) (0:790) (0:795) (0:798)
Rank 4￿Female ￿0:148 0:188 0:179 0:267 0:276
(0:403) (0:504) (0:506) (0:512) (0:513)
Rank 5￿Female ￿0:296 ￿0:020 ￿0:033 ￿0:001 0:004
(0:389) (0:475) (0:477) (0:482) (0:483)
Rank 6￿Female ￿0:367 0:010 0:005 0:090 0:094
(0:388) (0:471) (0:473) (0:479) (0:481)
Experience variables no yes yes yes yes
Experience￿ Gender interactions no yes yes yes yes
Education variables no yes yes yes yes
Education￿ Gender interactions no yes yes yes yes
N 19,307 19,307 19,307 19,307 19,307
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Exit is an absorbing state, so executives
who leave all our data sets and do not return for four years are classi￿ed as exited.
Exit is a binary variable equal to one in the year an executive exits the data set.
The sample excludes the last three years of data. All regressions include sector-
ial dummies, assets, employees, compensation last period, and two lags of excess
returns. Education variables are dummies for No College, MBA, MS/MA, Ph.D.,
and Professional Certi￿cation. Experience variables are years of managerial expe-
rience, years of tenure with the ￿rm, number of past ￿rm changes before becoming
an executive, and total number of past ￿rm changes.
41Table 8: Dynamic Gender-Gap Decomposition
Average
Expected Career Career Wage Discounted
Length (T) (W=T) Earnings
At Age 49
Male 4.8519 2,195,200 7,606,800
Female 3.0901 2,106,100 5,303,700
Female with Male Initial Assignment (q0)y 3.0524 2,240,700 5,494,000
Female with Male Job Transition (prs)z 3.0887 2,171,600 5,415,700
Female with Male Exit Rates (pr0)] 4.5186 2,061,400 6,907,800
Female with Male Initial Rank Assignment[ 3.2660 2,296,800 6,028,800
Female with Male Career Distribution\ 4.8519 2,298,500 8,092,300
At Age 39:
Male 4.9251 1,931,400 6,395,200
Female 3.1381 1,820,900 4,540,800
Female with Male Initial Assignment (q0)y 3.0495 1,897,300 4,534,500
Female with Male Job Transition (prs)z 3.1853 1,876,800 4,672,200
Female with Male Exit Rates (pr0)] 4.5752 1,890,000 6,146,000
Female with Male Initial Rank Assignment[ 3.2653 1,875,800 4,790,100
Female with Male Career Distribution\ 4.9251 2,034,400 6,862,000
y is the counterfactual if women changed in just one respect, by following the initial rank and
human capital distribution of men. z is the counterfactual if women changed in just one respect,
by following the transition pattern of men. ] is the counterfactual if women changed in just one
respect, by following the exit behavior of men. [ is the counterfactual if women changed in just one
respect, by following the initial rank distribution of men. \ is the counterfactual if women followed
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Figure 2: Executives￿Survival Probabilities
44Probability of being, CEO,  Chair(wo)man, or president 
conditional on survival and being an executive at age 39
Probability of being CEO conditional on being an executive 
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Probability of being CEO conditional on survival and being 
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Figure 3: Probabilities of Being CEO, Chair(wo)man, or President
45